Shell Hong Kong · EV Charging · Live model
Every slider re-runs 4,000 five-year scenarios in your browser. Nothing here is a fixed slide. If you disagree with an assumption, change it and watch what happens to the answer.
Added profit / yr
HK$ —
average, at full run-rate
Downside
HK$ —
worst 1 run in 10
Chance it pays
—
probability NPV above zero
Net present value
HK$ —
above the 8.3% required return, after build, enrolment and promotion — before the cost of whoever does the work
What you commit. No headcount in this number.
Drag these. They are estimates, not facts.
CLP HK$1.500 · HK Electric HK$1.997 · blended HK$1.565
Includes the one-off launch build (HK$1.4M) and customer acquisition (HK$1.36M, front-loaded) — costs the first version of this model left out. Annual revenue, built up over 24 months. The scale is anchored just below today's level and does not rescale as you drag — so the coloured bands genuinely grow and shrink with your assumptions.
Nothing here needs a construction programme. The only capital decision sits at month 12, and only if the data supports it.
| Phase | Months | What we do | Owner |
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Both figures are published. The hurdle is Shell's own group return; the warning is the only listed pure-play EV charging operator in Hong Kong.
The hurdle
9.4%
Shell plc group ROACE, 2025 (11.3% in 2024). Shown as context, not as a hurdle: ROACE is an accounting return on a part-depreciated asset base, not a cost of capital. Value is destroyed below the cost of capital — a programme can sit under ROACE, dilute the ratio, and still create value.
Contribution per dollar of programme spend, year 3: —
IRR is deliberately not shown. With no capital outlay the denominator is near zero, so IRR runs into the hundreds of percent and means nothing. Return on cost is the honest measure for an operating programme.
The comparable, read properly
HK$44.2M
Cornerstone Technologies (HKEX GEM:8391) FY2025 EV charging income — audited, up 85.3% from HK$23.9M, and now 35.3% of their revenue against 15.6% a year earlier.
Their HK$115M loss is not evidence about charging economics. Total revenue fell to HK$125.2M only because they chose to stop installing (−87.8%), and gross margin rose from 17.8% to 24.8%. Yet adjusted LBITDA was still −HK$34.4M — better than FY2024’s −HK$41.2M, but not close to self-funding, with accumulated losses of HK$617.8M and going-concern material uncertainty every period since 2020.
Growing charging fast, and improving the margin, still did not make it pay. Scale was not the answer to unit economics.
Read with care: adjusted LBITDA is a management-defined measure covering their whole EV business — hardware, installation, charging, overseas and corporate overhead — not the public network alone. No revenue-per-point figure can be derived, because the GO/HOME split is not disclosed.
Worth knowing: stock 8391 was a financial printer until it bought the charging business in August 2020, so accumulated losses are not all charging. Across 2,216 pages of filings they never disclose utilisation, HK$/kWh or electricity cost.
This is not a timeline. The horizontal axis is money, not time: each bar covers a band of five-year NPV, and its height is the share of the 4,000 simulations that landed in that band. Green is a gain, pink a loss. Programmes cancelled in year 2 sit separately on the left, because they all share one outcome and would otherwise flatten the rest.
Worst 10%: —
Middle: —
Best 10%: —
Longer bar means that assumption moves the result more. Argue about the top two.
They measure different things. The HK$2.7M is gross contribution per year once the programme is at full run-rate. The NPV is what is left over after four deductions: the years it takes to ramp, the ongoing promotional spend, the one-off build and enrolment cost, and a discount at Shell’s 8.3% cost of capital.
What this deliberately leaves out: the cost of people. There is no headcount line anywhere in the model. That is not a claim that the work is free — it is a claim that the prize should be sized before arguing about who does it. If the answer here were marginal, no resourcing conversation would be worth having. Read every number on this page as the size of the opportunity, not as profit.
So NPV is not the profit — it is the surplus above the return Shell already requires. A positive NPV means the programme beats the hurdle; HK$1.5M is the value created on top of clearing it. A HK$10M business returning exactly 8.3% would show an NPV of zero and still be perfectly sound.
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